The Study of the Subsidies Mechanism Design on Enterprise Emission Reduction by 蔡振宇
 











The Study of the Subsidies Mechanism Design on Enterprise 




指导教师姓名： 钱 争 鸣 教 授
专 业 名 称： 国 民 经 济 学 
论文提交日期： 2011  年  4 月 
论文答辩日期： 2011  年    月 
 
 




























声明人（签名）：             





















（     ）1.经厦门大学保密委员会审查核定的保密学位论文，
于   年  月  日解密，解密后适用上述授权。 






                        声明人（签名）：             









































































Currently the environmental problem is getting worse and worse, the excessive 
discharge of waste, air pollution caused by burning, water pollution, heavy metal 
pollution, soil pollution seriously affect the sustainable economic development,and 
threat people's health and the ecological balance. It is an urgent task to solve the 
pollution  discharge problem. 
The domestic research on solving the problem caused by enterprise emission 
mainly focus on the pollution discharge fees,the tradable discharge permit,the 
pollution discharge tax,most of the research with the game theory focus on building 
complete information static game to analyse the mixed strategetic game theory 
equilibrium on the relationship between the enterprise and the government.There are 
few research on the subsidies on emission reduction,especially on building an 
appropriate enterprise-government game for our country to design the contract. Based 
on game theory and principal-agent theory，this article mainly design the subsidies on 
emission reduction，analyse the agent risk and design appropriate contract in face of 
the agency moral risk to ensure the efficiency of the subsidy. 
Firstly,this article points out that the over-emission and deficiency of  emission 
reduction results from the economic externalities,and the government can solve the 
problem by designing appropriate contract.Secondly, this article designs the subsidies 
on emission reduction in face of information asymmetry,analyses the agency cost,and 
points out that the information asymmetry will increase the agency cost and decrease 
the enterprise effort as well as the efficiency of the contract.Thirdly,the government 
can drive the enterprise to reduce emission and decrease the cost of the contract by 
observing external information.Fourthly,this article designs the contracts in which the 
enterprise faces taskes to improve the quantity and the quality of emission reduction 
as well as reduction cooperation.At last,designs appropriate contract with the agent 
moral risk,such as the enterprise might lie on making great effort to reduce emission 
so as to get the subsidy, the local government might conspire with the enterprise to get 
















welfare.Also,the article analyses the impact of the governmental supervising 
efficiency on the contract, points out that the contract should change with the external 
factors,and the government can promote the social welfare by improving the 
governmental supervising efficiency and reducing the cost of the emission reduction. 
With insufficient budget，the government can improve the efficiency by imposing 
charge. 
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